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Development in electronic displays and computers have
enabled avionics designers to present the pilot with ever
increasing amounts of information in greater detail and with
more accuracy-

However, technological developments have not

always brought about enhancement of the pilot's role.
Investigating the interaction of cockpit crew members and the
vast array of automated systems they control and monitor will
contribute to the determination the effect this interface has
on the performance of the cockpit team.

This study utilized a

questionnaire to determine if the opinions of the flight crew
suggested performance is impacted negatively by automation.
There was no significant agreement suggesting that automation
impacted the flight crew performance negatively by inducing
complacency, loss of proficiency or by creating an unsafe
environment.

It did reveal that less experienced pilots were

less proficient and felt more overwhelmed with the newer
technology incorporating advanced automation.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The goal of the airline industry is a simple one. To
transport passengers from point A to point B in a
comfortable, safe, and optimum manner. Although the goal is
simple, the means by which it is accomplished is very
complex.

A principle facet in this endeavor is the

interaction between the pilot, crew members, and the
automated systems they control or monitor.

It is the

breakdown within this interface where many of the errors
occur which lead to aviation mishaps.
More than two-thirds of all air carrier mishaps are
attributed to pilot error (Stix, 1991) . Another source
suggests that seventy percent of the cases of airline
accidents may be traced to human factors in crew
performance.

The remaining thirty percent may be linked to

technical problems where human factors may also have been a
factor (North, 1992).

This rate is even higher for general

aviation where almost 9 out of 10 mishaps are attributed to
pilot error (Nagel, 1988).

To rectify this, aircraft

designers and operations managers utilize cockpit automation
to reduce the number of human errors.

The impetus is to

"automate human error out of the system"

1

(Curry, Wiener,
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1980).

The belief is that control devices are extremely

good at real-time control, but must be supported by the
remarkable flexibility of the human as supervisor and
standby controller, in case of breakdown or other unforeseen
events (Curry, Wiener, 1980).
Recent research has shown that automation, implemented
with insufficient consideration to the human factors
interface, can frequently create more problems than it
solves (Bergeron, Hinton, 1985).
work more than relieve it.

The new cockpits realign

Programming a computer to fly

the aircraft results in a shift in the role of the pilot
from one of controller to one of monitor (Hughes, 1992a, in
press-a).

Humans have proven that they are not so good at

the monitoring task and are highly likely to miss critical
signals, as well as to make occasional commissive errors
(Curry, Wiener, 1980).
There are many human factors areas involved in pilot
error in which investigation is warranted:

flight station

organization, crew interaction, fitness for duty (fatigue,
health), judgment, sensory illusion, distractions, and
complacency induced by reliability of equipment (Lederer,
1988).

These factors singularly or in combination have a

tremendous impact on the pilot.

To limit the scope, this

thesis will focus on the complacency and loss of proficiency
induced by automation, and any safety consequences that
result from this interface.
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Statement of the Problem
Development in electronic displays and computers have
enabled avionics designers to present the pilot with ever
increasing amounts of information in greater detail and with
more accuracy.

There is evidence that this new technology

may change the pilot's workload to the detriment of
performance.
Significance of the Problem
Degradation of the pilot's performance during flight is
the opposite result sought by those incorporating automation
into the flight compartment.

Detracting from the ability of

a flight deck crew member to perform optimally increases the
opportunity for this trend to continue.

It is apparent that

the study of the effect flight-deck automation has on pilot
performance is one of dire concern to commercial, military
and general aviation aircraft designers, managers and
operators.
Review of the Literature
Benefits of automation.
quite numerous.

The benefits of automation are

They may be categorized into two types.

First, automation allows certain functions to be performed
that could not be accomplished otherwise.

Second, automated

systems are often able to provide more precise performance
than humans (Boehm- Davis, Curry, Harrison, Wiener, 1983) .
Accepting automation as an actual improvement to aviation,
designers and system operators find several reasons for its
implementation.
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First, the improvement of microprocessor technology has
enabled the aircraft designer to incorporate equipment which
are smaller, cost less, use less power, and perform more
reliably and precisely than the traditional manual
equipment.

This specifically addresses the problem of

economy of cockpit space.

It also provides display

flexibility and more precise flight maneuvers and
navigation.
Second, economy of operation, improved reliability and
decreased maintenance are directly improved.

The flight

profiles flown via computer are more precise and provide for
exacting fuel efficient flight paths. The improved
electronic equipment have experienced less down time than
their analog counterparts.

This directly decreases the

amount of maintenance required.
Third, safety considerations are always an issue,
especially when over two-thirds of the mishaps are
attributed to pilot error. Autopilots, flight directors,
and alerting and warning systems are examples of automatic
systems that have had a beneficial effect on pilot safety
margins.

The ground proximity warning system (GPWS) is an

excellent example.

It was mandated by Congress in 1974 and

has been responsible for a major reduction in terrain
strikes as a result (Curry, Wiener, 1980).
Lastly, the reduction of pilot workload is believed to
be a direct outcome of this automation.

By relieving the

pilot from the routine manual controlling and calculations,
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they are free to more effectively supervise the flight and
to concentrate and act more precisely during an emergency.
Automation also frees the pilot during the most critical
aspect of the flight, descent to landing, and allows them to
keep their heads out of the cockpit and scan for other
aircraft.

Also as important is the performance of tasks in

the new two-pilot wide-body aircraft that were previously
done with three.

Here it is particularly essential that

automated systems take up the slack and reduce the workload.
Reducing workload is a phrase often associated with
flight station automation, but might be a misnomer.

The

role shifts from one of hands-on operator to one of monitor.
While it is true that this reduces physical workload,
cognitive processes are increased due to monitoring.

A

survey of 100 Boeing 767 pilots from three airlines reflects
the controversy over this issue.

When asked if "automation

reduces overall workload," 47 percent agreed and 36 percent
disagreed.

Similarly, 53 percent agreed and 37 percent

disagreed that "automation does not reduce overall workload,
since there is more to keep watch over" (Curry, 1984) .

One

airline captain stated "I've never been so busy in my life,
and someday this stuff is going to bite me" (Phillips,
1992) .
Automation induced problems.

The thoughts of pilots

with regards to automation is of mixed blessings.

The

innovations have made flying very efficient, but the flip
side is reflected in this anecdote:

the new design puts a
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man and a dog in an airplane.

The dog is there to bite the

pilot if the man so much as tries to touch the controls.
The pilot's one remaining job is to feed the dog (Stix,
1991) . Automation has not gone this far, but the effect it
has on the pilot requires attention.

Other than take-off

and landing, the pilot's role is basically reduced to one of
systems monitor.

The role of controller and monitor not

only require different skills, but are also in conflict with
one another.

Controlling the system requires proficiency in

the manual skills.

Prolonged use of the automatic mode may

lead to a deterioration of manual skills, the same skills
which might be required due to systems failure or another
emergency.
The longer the pilot acts as a monitor, the more
degraded his performance will become. During long transits
the pilots are less challenged, prone to boredom,
complacency, and in extreme cases falling asleep (BoehmDavis, Curry, Harrison, Weiner, 1983).

Studies have shown

that 55.2 percent of all aircraft mishaps occur during the
descent through final approach phase (Nagel, 1988) . This is
the most critical phase of flight, immediately following the
period of peak complacency during the monotonous monitoring
phase of the transit.

Staying with or ahead of the aircraft

when monitoring is a constant battle against boredom and
complacency.

The time required to "catch up" with the

aircraft during the final phase and particularly during an
emergency may be unavailable.
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One study was conducted to determine the effect of
variations in the reliability of an automated monitoring
system on human operator detection of automation failures.
Two groups were utilized, one with constant-reliability
automation detection and one with variable-reliability
automation detection.

Subjects performed manual tracking

and fuel-management tasks along with system-monitoring which
was under automation control. Automation reliability, or
the percentage of system malfunctions detected
automatically, was held constant over time at a high or low
level, or was alternated over time from low to high with the
groups respectively.

The results indicated that the group

with the constant-reliability of automation failures were
significantly worse than the variable-reliability group.
The study provided empirical evidence of the consequences of
automation-induced complacency on pilot performance (Molloy,
Parasuraman, Singh, 1993).
These problems are more pronounced with highly
automated aircraft such as the Boeing-767.

Certain tasks

are more complicated to direct via the automated system than
to perform manually.

There has been a tendency for crews to

attempt to program their way out of trouble with the
automatic devices instead of disengaging and flying
manually.

This tendency exacerbates the deterioration of

piloting skills due to the overuse of automation.

It also

creates a perception among pilots of "loss of control" or
being "out of the loop" (Wiener, 1985).

For example, one
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pilot was asked by air traffic control to intercept an
airway.

The flight management system (FMS) provides no

convenient way of performing this task.

By the time the

pilot figured out he could not, they were long past the
airway (Hughes, 1992b, in press-b).
Boeing is working to reverse this perception with the
design of the Boeing 777. Their belief is that advances in
automation should be evolutionary and strive to maintain the
pilot in the decision loop.

They are trying to design the

flight deck that is appropriate to the pilot's operation and
to enhance their situational awareness.

To combat the

specific criticism that the crew spends excessive amounts of
head-down time scanning instruments, Boeing implemented
several solutions which include the streamlining of (FMS)
computer functions, the use of colors consistent between
displays and the incorporation of data link ("Avionics
Companies," 1992).

Data link specifically reduces heads-

down time by linking the FMS computer with the
communications facilities, automatically incorporating
frequency changes and recording information and instructions
(O'lone, 1992).
Results of two other studies provide information of the
difficulty pilots have with the understanding and operation
of the FMS.

The pilots did become proficient in the

standard use of the system, but again had difficulty
tracking its status and predicting its behavior during
certain aspects of the flight.

Difficulties with the
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understanding of the functional system structure were also
revealed.

This again supports the need for better system

design (Sarter, Woods, 1992).
The design to limit the response to control inputs to
maintain the aircraft within its safe operating envelope is
a perfect example of this perception problem.

This design

has benefits and limitations which model the larger problem
as a whole.

The ability of an automated system to override

pilot inputs are desirable in situations such as an
encounter with wind shear.

The Airbus Industrie uses fly-

by-wire on its A320 in part because of the increased safety
it offers through the flight envelope and for wind shear
protection (Lenorovitz, 1992).
Wind shear is a phenomena associated with thunderstorms
in which extreme downward airflow forces the aircraft to
lose altitude.

Here, the pilots must react quickly with

large control forces to prevent ground impact.

The largest

danger is the possibility of stalling the aircraft while
performing the escape procedures.

By limiting the control

inputs to those which will not produce a stall, the pilots
are confident of flying to the edge of the envelope.
The flip side occurs during evasive maneuvering to
avoid a midair collision.

By limiting inputs to those

within design parameters, the pilots may be unable to avoid
impact.

In this scenario it would obviously be better to

over-stress the aircraft and avoid a mid-air collision.
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It is important that the issue of skills deterioration
be revisited.

The problem results not only from the failure

to perform the manual skills on a routine basis, but at the
same time, it is partially neglected during training.

The

development of a training program is difficult due to the
dual capacity of the pilot:

one as monitor of the system in

the fully automatic mode, and one as controller of the
system during any other mode. Determining the degree of
training for off-line manipulation of the system is a
difficult problem.

The scenarios practiced during training

may not occur, or occur with a sufficient span of time to
preclude the pilot's proficiency.
The difficulty with training is also hampered by the
mixture of old and new equipment in the cockpits.

Training

programs which implement the latest in automated devices
serve little purpose for a flight officer assigned to an
older generation aircraft.
Automation consequences.

The aviation community is

replete with mishaps attributed to pilot error.

What must

be considered is if the airplanes are too complex. Did
automation in trying to eliminate pilot error create other
errors by inducing overload, complacency or lack of
proficiency?

Presentation of examples should help in such

analysis.
The Lockheed L-1011 that crashed in the Florida
Everglades in 1972 (NTSB, 1973) is an example of a system
failing and the subsequent failure of the pilots to detect

11
it.

The autopilot disengaged and the aircraft entered a

gradual descent while in holding which resulted in impact
with the ground.
emergency.

The crew were distracted by a landing gear

This type of emergency does not require an

immediate action and is considered a deferred malfunction.
This means there is time to evaluate the malfunction and
determine a proper course of action.

Due to the inattention

of the crew and subsequent failure to recognize the loss of
the autopilot control of the aircraft altitude, the aircraft
and all aboard were lost.

It has been suggested that prior

use of this automatic system induced the complacency of the
crew to accept the invulnerability of the automation, and
therefore divorce its function from their attention.
The Korean Air Lines flight 007 shot down by a Soviet
military aircraft while flying in Soviet airspace is another
good example.

The determination of the cause was considered

to be the incorrect position entered into the inertial
navigation system (Bailey, 1989).

The failure of the crew

to properly monitor their position via traditional means as
a backup to the inertial guidance is another form of
complacency.

The crew could possibly have lost the ability

to perform such a function due to their complete reliance
upon the system.

This complacency and lack of proficiency

if induced by automation may manifest itself in future
incidents and accidents.

With the enormous numbers of

people and equipment flying the skies of today and the
future, it is imperative that the interactions between the
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operators and their equipment be investigated to the most
meticulous detail.
Automation defined.

Automation as used in this study

is the utilization of equipment and devices to perform tasks
originally accomplished by the pilot.

The continuous

advances in the aerospace industry in the field of
airframes, systems and avionics have burgeoned into the
ultra-modern cockpits of today-

The fully automated

aircraft include equipment performing every possible
function.

The "Glass Cockpit" of the most advanced aircraft

introduce an entirely new design of flat displays, computer
management and redundant systems to assist the pilot in the
most efficient, effective and optimum way possible.

It is

not the intention of this study to determine the effect that
a specific piece of equipment or a certain cockpit
configuration has on the performance of the flight crew.

It

is the intention to determine the overall impact automation
has on the flight crew performance and their interaction
with such technology.

Therefore, automation is defined as

equipment utilized by a cockpit crew member to perform tasks
previously performed by the pilot.

This allows for the

differences in opinions as to what truly is automated, and
enables each individual pilot to express their personal
interaction with the equipment.
Statement of Hypotheses
If the increase in flight-deck automation impacts the
pilot in such a way as to induce complacency, loss of
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proficiency or to create an unsafe environment, then it will
be manifest in the attitude of the flight deck crew.

There

is no significant difference between the responses of the
pilots from American Airlines (AAL) and the pilots of Delta
Air Lines (DAL) nor between the captains and first officers.

CHAPTER II
Method
Subjects
Definition of the population incorporating flight-deck
automation was determined by the definition utilized to
describe the automation.

As mentioned, most aircraft

incorporate some degree of automation in the design of the
flight deck.

This automation was found in varying degree

within the military, commercial and general aviation
aircraft designs.

The scope of this thesis was not to

generalize to all three categories, and hence was narrowed
to the commercial carrier aircraft community This commercial carrier population was also
considerably varied and included many platforms with varying
degree of cockpit automation.

The objective was to analyze

the effect automation within the cockpit has on pilot
performance, and to determine whether that automation was a
benefit or a detriment, with particular emphasis on safety.
Therefore, some degree of differentiation was needed to
achieve this determination.

The population was thus defined

in the following manner.
Subjects for this study were selected from the
population of pilots who currently utilize two specific
14
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platforms, the Boeing 757 and the Boeing 767. These
platforms were selected due to the similar design and
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aircraft type rating
criteria.

One type rating is utilized for both cockpits.

The population was further narrowed to include only carriers
located within the United States. The sample of subjects
were stratified by carrier, with subjects selected according
to availability.
The preferred method was to obtain the exact number of
pilots within each carrier flying this specific equipment
and select a random sample from each utilizing a table of
random numbers.

This research was classified as descriptive

and a sample size of ten percent was appropriate.

Obtaining

these numbers and the required information to include the
subjects in the sample was hindered by the privacy
maintained within each company.
The limited resources of the author required further
reduction in sample size and location.

The resulting

approach was narrowed to target the three major carriers;
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and United Airlines,
located in the local vicinity.

The Los Angeles

International Airport (LAX) was selected and permission was
secured to conduct the survey for American and Delta pilots
only.

Each carrier consisted of approximately 200 pilots

domiciled at LAX flying the selected equipment, 75 of which
were selected from each for the study.

The 75 were than

randomly selected by no established pattern.
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It is obvious that bias exists in the selection of
subjects for the sample population.

Convenience sampling

was utilized to generate the group which created significant
bias due to the non-probability of the sampling technique.
This bias was increased due to the utilization of carriers
within the vicinity of the author.

This limited the

geographic exposure as well as the number of different
carriers there were to choose from.

These factors were

important since each carrier has its own training program
addressing many of the issues investigated in this study in
a significantly different manner.
Instruments
A questionnaire was developed to collect information
from pilots of the Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft.

The

questions were directed at the effect automation is having
on individual performance, cockpit coordination and
management, safety issues, and overall impact. The
instrument was created specifically for this study, and thus
validity and reliability data are unavailable.

A pilot

study was conducted to determine the appropriateness of
content, clarity of instruction, and effectiveness of
obtaining the desired information prior to the instruments
finalization and delivery.
Research of this nature required development of an
instrument since specific information was needed in this
unique field.

The reliability of this instrument is

dependent upon the individual interpretation of the relative

17
scale agreement or disagreement for a each question.

The

cover letters with instructions as well as the questionnaire
are included for critical review in Appendix B and C
respectively.
Design
This thesis is classified as evaluation, utilizing the
systematic process of collecting and analyzing data in order
to make decisions.

This evaluation assessed the current

environment in one of the most advanced platforms flying
today.

The natural setting characteristic of this

particular evaluation precluded the control prevalent in
most research.

Hence, the sole purpose of this evaluation

research was to facilitate better decision making for future
cockpit design.
This thesis design was chosen because of the inherent
complexities, associated with cockpit management and piloting
skills.

Elaborate methods of conducting experimental

analysis have been undertaken, but the funds for these
endeavors were vast in comparison to those available for
this study.

Companies and agencies have expanded on the

central idea of this thesis utilizing wide differences in
design to achieve essentially the same objectives.
There are numerous variables which could not be
controlled in this design, or were beyond its scope. The
large variation in cockpit utilization of automation was
one.

This was reduced by the selection of a specific

population and aircraft, which subsequently detracts from
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the ability to generalize from the study.

Also, the

procedures performed by flight crews are carrier dependent,
and the study was incapable of addressing individual
differences.

The forthright honesty of the respondents was

also a variable, since it cannot be determined through
observation if the responses match the actual environment
occurring in flight.
Procedures
A pilot study was conducted introducing the
questionnaire developed for the study.
airlines and platforms were utilized.

Pilots from numerous
These pilots were

fellow Reserve Naval Aviators attached to Patrol Squadron 65
at the Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) Pt. Mugu,
California.

Feedback from these pilots helped finalize the

questionnaire.
The sample population was then selected from the
available population of pilots at the Los Angeles airport.
Three major carriers were targeted according to their
accessibility.

These were American Airlines, Delta Air

Lines and United Airlines.

Permission and assistance was

requested from each of the three carrier Chief Pilots by
fellow pilots who hand delivered the questionnaire and
appropriate cover letter.

Personal contact was then made

asking permission to conduct the survey, and to request that
the Chief Pilots provide any required assistance to the
selected pilots. American and Delta gave approval.

It is

interesting to note that the reluctance of United was due to
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the recent broadcast of the vulnerability of the Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) depicting
negative attitudes toward the equipment.

This airline felt

that the facts were misrepresented in the program and hence
refused to participate in this study to preclude a similar
occurrence.
The carrier specific cover letters were then produced
and delivered with appropriately labeled, self-addressed,
stamped return envelopes along with the questionnaires.
Each packet was numbered and then hand delivered into
individual pilot mailboxes at the LAX hub according to the
depiction indicating the platform flown by the pilot.
questionnaires were randomly distributed at whim.
identifying criteria were collected.

The

No

The subjects were

given two weeks to complete the study.
The questionnaire collected information concerning the
pilots' utilization of automated equipment, their general
and specific attitude towards its usage, and specific
impacts that automation has on piloting.

Analysis of this

information determined if there was significant agreement on
the impact that automation is having on pilot performance
and safety.

CHAPTER III
Data Analysis
The data collected from this questionnaire is defined
as nominal data, with answers given according to a relative,
ordinal scale. The nominal data consists of true categories
for the first two questions, cockpit position and years
experience, followed by artificial categories for the
remainder.

The artificial categories allow for a one of

five choice in varying degrees of percentages or agreement
for a specific question/statement.

The data collected may

be considered ordinal by classifying the responses in terms
of the amount by which they agree, however they are truly
nominal and hence limit the type statistics which may be
performed.
The population as previously defined are represented by
the sample selected for this study.

This sample of the

population provided the data necessary to perform the
statistical computations.

This study utilized percentage

response calculations and the chi-square (X2) . The latter
calculation is a nonparametric test of significance, and was
utilized to determine if their were significant differences
between the groups involved in the study.
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This allowed for
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a combination of comparisons and relationships to be
determined from the data collected.
First, the data was stratified into two separate
groups, the pilots of American Airlines (AAL) versus the
pilots of Delta Air Lines (DAL).

The outcome of these

calculations determined if the questionnaires could be
combined or kept separate for additional comparisons.
Specifically,

if their was no significant difference

between the pilots of the two airlines on a particular
question, then the entire number of respondents were
combined on that specific question to determine the next
comparison.
The second step was the comparison between the captain
and first officer positions.

If their was a significant

difference between the two airline groups on a specific
question, then two separate calculations were made to make
comparisons within each carrier.

This was necessary to

allow for the proper application of inferences from the
data.

For a summary of the outcome of these calculations,

refer to appendix A.
Demographics
Sample size.

Of the one hundred fifty questionnaires

delivered, seventy-five per carrier, forty-nine were
returned from American and fifty-two from Delta.

American

respondents were comprised of twenty-seven captains and
twenty-two first officers. Delta consisted of twenty-four
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captains and twenty-eight first officers.

Table 1 lists the

years experience of the pilots responding.
Table 1
Years experience in the B-757/767

Response (Years) N(%)

Group

nD

<1

Captain

27

1(4)

4(15)

First Officer

22

1(4)

Captain

24

3(13)

First Officer

28

5-6

>6

11(41)

3(11)

8(30)

11(50)

7(32)

0 (0)

3(14)

6(25)

2 (8)

2 (8)

11(46)

10(36) 11(39)

4(14)

0 (0)

3(11)

1-2

3-4

American

Delta

a

N is the number of respondents answering this category and
the respective percentage of the total responding. bTotal
number of respondents from this group.
There was a significant difference in the number of
years experience between the carriers.

Hence, we reject the

null hypothesis that there was no significant difference
with the experience level of these pilots.

Specifically,

American consisted of thirty-three pilots with one to four
years experience in the Boeing 757/767 and fourteen with
five or more years.

Delta consisted of thirty pilots with

23
two or less years experience in the same cockpit and sixteen
with five or more years.
Additionally, there was a significant difference found
between the years experience between the captains and first
officers for the pilots of Delta.

Twenty-one of the thirty

Delta pilots with two years or less experience were first
officers.

Eleven of the fourteen with six or more years

were captains. The captains have significantly more
experience than the first officers for Delta at the LAX hub.
It is necessary to be particularly alert to this difference
to determine if there are significant differences between
these two groups on the remaining questions.
To begin the search for data suggesting that extensive
automation usage may create an unsafe environment, the first
step was to determine the perception that the users have of
the equipment.

Thus far, we have defined a population that

is varied in experience and equally divided in cockpit
position.
Automation composition.

When asked what percentage of

flying skills are automated, seventy-two percent of the
pilots responding said that greater than half of the tasks
were automated.

One Delta pilot stated that "everything

from above 18000' to the final approach fix (FAF)-unless it
is in the way", was automated.

An American pilot stated

that "virtually all pilot actions can be automated, however,
pilots that wish to maintain proficiency will seldom depend
on automated systems during critical phases of flight
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(takeoff, departure, approach & landing)".

Table 2 lists

the responses to this question.
Table 2
Percentage of flying skills that are considered automated

Response (Percentage) N(%)rt

nb

<25

American

47

Delta

50

Group

25-50

51-75

76-90

>90

1 (2) 11(23)

15(32)

18(38)

2 (4)

6(12)

15(30)

14(28)

6(12)

9(18)

a

N is the number of respondents answering this category and
the respective percentage of the total responding. bTotal
number of respondents from this group.
When asked what percentage of time that the pilot
utilized these automated systems, sixty-three percent of the
American pilots said that greater than seventy-six percent
of the time automation is used.

Only forty-seven percent of

the Delta pilots said that more than seventy-six percent of
the time they used automation, while eighty-four percent
said greater than fifty percent of the time they used it.
One pilot drew a graph of cockpit workload during the entire
flight and then delineated the percentage time that
automation is used.

That representation summarized the

position of most of the respondents and indicated that a
pattern of automation use occurs throughout the flight.
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This pattern depicted that automation was available
throughout the flight evolution, but was completely
dependent upon personal choice of whether the automation was
utilized.

Table 3 lists the responses to this question.

Table 3
Percentage of time automated systems are utilized

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

Group

nb

<25

American

49

0 (0)

Delta

52

2 (4)

25-50

51-75

76-90

>90

5(10)

13(27)

29(59)

2 (4)

7(13)

19(37)

19(37)

5(10)

a

N is the number of respondents answering this category and
the respective percentage of the total responding. bTotal
number of respondents from this group.
Having questioned the amount of automation and the time
required to utilize it, a probe into the general attitude
the user has towards its implementation was in order.

The

next question asked if the pilots felt that too many
activities were automated.

Fifty-eight percent of all

pilots stated that they disagreed.

Seven percent strongly

disagreed while twenty-five percent were neutral.
table 4 for comparison.

Refer to
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Table 4
Are too many systems, procedures, tasks automated?

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

nb

Group

SD

D

N

A

SA

American

49

5(10)

29(59) 12(24)

3 (6)

0 (0)

Delta

51

2 (4)

29(57) 13(25)

4 (8)

3 (6)

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
The survey now began to focus and exact more specific
information from the respondents.

The next group of

questions were utilized to attack the crux of the research
hypothesis.
Safety impact.

The pilots were asked point blank if

any form of automation created an unsafe environment in the
cockpit.

There was a significant difference between the

pilots of American and Delta with their responses to this
question.

There was no clear line of support or lack of

support for this question as depicted in Table 5.
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Table 5
Has automation created an unsafe environment?

Response (Percentage) N(%T

nb

SD

27

4(15)

8(30)

9(33)

6(22)

0 (0)

First Officer 21

2(10)

9(43)

2(10)

8(38)

0 (0)

Group

D

N

A

SA

American
Captain

Delta
24

0

(0)

12(50)

4(17)

8(33)

0

(0)

First Officer 28

0

(0)

8(29)

5(18)

13(46)

2

(7)

Captain

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
Thirty-five percent of the American pilots disagreed
and thirteen percent strongly disagreed that automation
created an unsafe environment in the cockpit.

Similarly,

thirty-eight percent Delta pilots disagreed as well.
Conversely, twenty-nine percent of American pilots agreed
with the question while forty percent Delta pilots agreed
and four percent strongly agreed.

Several of the comments

suggested that the automation could create such dangers when
familiarity was less and a pilot was still learning the
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system.

One pilot said "until the last couple of years when

we were taught automation download, there were too many guys
playing with the FMS below 10,000' in high density
environment.

Now most of us use manual auto flight

functions when changes need to be made to the FMS in high
density airspace below 10,000/l!.
This last question was not definitive hence the pilots
were asked if a specific task performed by automation
created a situation requiring manual backup or performance
of the task using basic pilotage.

Sixty-eight percent of

all pilots agreed and twelve percent strongly agreed.

One

pilot said that "the professional pilot is always mentally
flying the aircraft; therefore, he backs up automation with
pilotage".

Table 6 lists the responses to this question.

Table 6
Has any automated task required manual backup?

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

Group

nb

SD

D

N

A

SA

American

47

0 (0)

6(13)

4 (9)

32(68)

5(11)

Delta

52

0 (0)

5(10)

5(10)

35(67)

7(13)

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
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To continue this line of questioning, more specific
questions regarding the use of automation were utilized.
These questions were aimed at obtaining responses to the
specific instances that may have caused difficulties or
worse.

The use of the majority of the cockpit equipment

requires a pilot to perform tasks inside the cockpit with
their full attention applied to the problem, task or
procedure.

Many incident reports have documented near

misses of aircraft while airborne as well as during ground
evolutions.

Hence, this was a logical continuance of the

investigation.
Specific equipment impact. The pilots were asked if
the flight management computer kept them inside the cockpit
too much, particularly during the low altitude phases of
flight during higher traffic volume. There was a
significant difference between the responses of the American
and Delta pilots on this question.

Fifty-five percent of

American pilots disagreed when asked if the flight
management computer (FMC) kept them inside the cockpit too
much instead of outside scanning for aircraft.

One American

pilot stated that "until the pilot is very familiar with the
FMC, too much time is spent inside the cockpit during
critical phases of flight.

However, as experience increases

in type, a transition occurs where more time can be spent
outside the cockpit".
Thirty-three percent of Delta pilots agreed and the
same number disagreed on the same question.

One pilot said
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that "if you followed company procedures below 10,000', this
is no problem" . Another pilot said that the FMS designer
did not consider runway changes in the equipment
development, which was suggested by several other pilots.
One comment iterated that last minute changes and re-routes
as well as runway changes could be distracting, let alone
any kind of emergency or inclement weather.

The results of

this question are listed in Table 7.
Table 7
Flight management computer's impact on outside scan

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

Group

nb

SD

D

N

A

SA

American
Captain

27

1 (4) 16(59)

3(11)

5(19)

2 (7)

First Officer

22

0 (0) 11(50)

4(18)

7(32)

0 (0)

Captain

23

0 (0)

9(35)

5(22)

10(43)

0 (0)

First Officer

28

5(18)

8(29)

8(29)

7(25)

0 (0)

Delta

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
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The next question was related to this last one and
received similar responses.

Forty-one percent of all pilots

disagreed that automation requirements were too time
consuming particularly during the critical phases of flight.
Twenty-seven percent agreed however while six pilots wrote
comments that the time requirements could be dangerous, but
only if you allowed them to be. The responses for this
question are listed in Table 8.
Table 8
Automation time requirements for critical phases of flight

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

Group

nb

American

49

2 (4)

24(49) 12(24)

10(20)

1 (2)

Delta

52

6(12)

17(33) 13(25)

15(29)

1 (2)

SD

D

N

A

SA

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
Many ideas have been developed to help alleviate these
last two problems by

creating procedures and/or equipment

to assist the pilots during the more critical phases of
flight.

This next piece of equipment is one such device and

has also been in the spotlight previously.

Fifty-two
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percent of all pilots disagreed and thirteen percent
strongly disagreed when asked if TCAS deterred a good look
out doctrine.

Of the eighteen percent of pilots that

agreed, forty-three percent disagreed or strongly disagreed
and forty-seven percent were neutral when asked if this
dependency will lead to an aviation mishap.

The majority of

the comments supported the equipments' use and praised the
capabilities and performance of the TCAS.
stated "TCAS is a great tool.

One Captain

I've seen more aircraft than

I've ever seen before. At least when you are alerted, it
does get your eyes out of the cockpit and gives a general
place to look.
awareness.
though".

I think it greatly increases situational

In my cockpit, we NEVER rely just on TCAS,

The responses to the first question about TCAS are

listed in Table 9.

Question #16 is not tabulated.
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Table 9
Does TCAS dependency substitute a good lookout doctrine?

Response (Percentage) N(%)*

Group

nb

SD

D

N

A

SA

American

49

9(18)

25(51)

6(12)

9(18)

0 (0)

Delta

52

4 (8)

27(52) 12(23)

9(17)

0 (0)

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
Flight proficiency and workload.

This next question is

often asked and is of an ongoing concern with the FAA, the
airlines and the pilots as well.

There are many advocates

of automation but even within their ranks, the topic of
skills deterioration is of utmost concern.

There was a

significant difference with the responses between the pilots
of American and Delta on the critical question of whether
automation use was causing deterioration of manual flying
skills.

The results produced forty-nine percent

disagreement from American and twenty-nine percent
disagreement from Delta pilots.

Thirty-five percent

American and thirty-eight percent Delta pilots agreed
however.

The comments varied equally as well.

Several
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comments stated that the professional pilot will fly the
aircraft manually enough to remain proficient.

At the same

time, several other comments suggested that there is no
standard to maintain manual proficiency and that many pilots
do not fly manually unless they have to.

Table 10 lists the

responses to this critical question.
Table 10
Is automation causing the deterioration of manual skills?

Response

Group

n°

SD

(Percentage) N ( % ) a

N

SA

American
Captain

27

0

(0)

14(52)

2 (7)

First Officer

22

3(14)

10(45)

1

Captain

24

0

(0)

First Officer

28

5(18)

11(41)

0 (0)

(5)

6(27)

2 (9)

7(29)

6(25)

11(46)

0 (0)

8(29)

6(21)

9(32)

0 (0)

Delta

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. a N is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. b Total number of
respondents from this group.
When asked specifically if they fly the aircraft
manually frequently enough to maintain skills at a level
capable of performing functions off-line during an
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emergency, fifty-eight percent of all pilots agreed and
twenty-six percent strongly agreed that they did.
twelve percent disagreed.

Only

The replies for this question are

in Table 11.
Table 11
Proficiency level of manual skills sufficient to perform
emergencies

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

Group

nb

SD

D

N

A

SA

American

49

1 (2)

3 (6)

6(12)

26(53)

13(27)

Delta

52

0 (0)

2 (4)

5(10)

32(62)

13(25)

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
The next question asked if automation increases the
pilots' workload.

There was a significant difference with

the responses between the pilots of American and Delta.
Sixty-one percent of the American pilots disagreed that
automation increases workload.

Forty-six percent of the

Delta pilots agreed that workload was increased.

The

comments continue this disparity by suggesting that
different phases of flight as well as different situations
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create different levels of work.

One pilot stated

"automation reduces workload (for the better) during low
stress periods.

However, during high workload periods such

as descent/approach with minor or major flight plan changes,
automation can become a problem.

During high work load

periods I think it is better to decrease use of FMS and
revert to basic flying procedures.

It is less stressful and

keeps ones eyes out of the cockpit. Automation may increase
work load during high activity periods because we have to
monitor what we put into the FMS, what it is doing, and
monitor the airplane".

The results of this question are

listed in Table 12.
Table 12
Does automation increase your workload?

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

Group

nb

SD

D

N

A

SA

American

48

8(17)

21(44)

7(15)

12(25)

0 (0)

Delta

52

2 (4)

20(38)

6(12)

20(38)

4 (8)

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.

37
The next questions address the second and equal area of
concern for those supporting automation and those opposing.
The environment where tasks are performed by machines
creates the situation where one is concerned that the
operator may grow dependent upon that function, and
eventually lose all precaution to the equipments
vulnerability.
Induced complacency.

When asked if extensive use of

automation will induce complacency, fifty-seven percent of
all pilots agreed while nine percent strongly agreed.

Every

comment stated similar responses, that the professional
pilot will not allow this to happen by flying the aircraft
manually or performing other tasks manually

Table 13 lists

the responses to this latest question.
Table 13
Does automation induce complacency on the flight deck?

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

Group

nb

SD

D

N

A

SA

American

49

1 (2)

10(20)

5(10)

29(59)

4 (8)

Delta

52

2 (4)

8(15)

9(17)

28(54)

5(10)

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
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The pilots were then questioned pointedly whether
automation had made them complacent, specifically in a way
that detracted from their optimum performance.

Fifty

percent disagreed and four percent strongly disagreed.

At

the same time, twenty-nine percent agreed that automation
had made them complacent.

These results are listed in Table

14.
Table 14
Has automation made you complacent?

Response (Percentage) N(%) a

Group

nb

American

49

3 (6)

22(45)

9(18)

15(31)

0 (0)

Delta

52

1 (2)

28(54)

9(17)

14(27)

0 (0)

SD

D

N

A

SA

Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral;
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of
respondents answering this category and the respective
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of
respondents from this group.
This concluded the questions designed to facilitate the
research hypothesis.

The remaining questions were asked to

help determine the overall feeling that the pilots have
towards the trends in automation design and implementation.
Future implementation.

There was a significant

difference between the responses of the pilots from American
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and Delta when asked if future implementation of automation
into the cockpit would create a more stressful and higher
workload environment.

There was similar disagreement

however, with 53% of American and 55% of Delta disagreeing.
The last question produced 52% disagreement when asked
about the future roles that automation would play in cockpit
design and pilot interaction.

The question was geared

towards the future use of automation which would shift the
pilots role from one of controller to one of monitor.

The

comments from the pilots suggested that the lessons learned
from the automated systems and the difficulties encountered
will help designers and operators to preclude this shift in
roles and maybe prevent future aircraft incidents and
accidents.

One pilot stated "that the inability to

disconnect the automated system on the Airbus Industrie
aircraft which lead to the total loss of aircraft and crew"
was a perfect example of the operational application of the
learned errors of automation.
tabulated.

Questions #15 and #16 are not
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CHAPTER IV
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
Findings
There were one hundred fifty pilots selected to
participate in this study.

American Airlines had a 65.3%

return rate while Delta Air Lines had 69.3% This presented
sufficient data to conduct the analysis and thus the data
was equally representative of the carriers. The paragraphs
that follow will highlight the findings of this
investigation.
1.

There was a significant difference in the years

experience between the carriers, and between the captains
and first officers of Delta Air Lines. The data suggest
that the pilots of American have significantly more
experience than those of Delta at the LAX hub.
Additionally, the captains of Delta have significantly more
experience than the first officers. Normally, the captains
should have more years in the cockpit than the first
officers.

However, since there was a significant difference

between both carriers, it appears that the pilot population
in the first officer position at Delta is much less
experienced than the rest of the sample.

It will be

important to be particularly alert to this factor while
analyzing the remaining questions to determine if these
first officers answer in a significantly different manner.
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2.

The initial questions determined that there was

general agreement about how many systems were automated and
that automated functions were utilized the majority of the
time.

There was majority agreement among the pilots that

there is not too much automation.

Their comments suggested

that there is a choice with the amount of automation a pilot
wishes to use. Given a choice, it is logical to expect
their decision to balance on the side of safety.

Hence, if

an automated task presents a situation that may be unsafe,
then the pilot will likely choose to perform that task
manually to avoid the conflict.

To determine if this were

the case, the next step was to question whether the general
utilization of automation and the procedures necessary for
its implementation created any situations which may reduce
safety.
3.

There was slightly higher disagreement among

American pilots when asked if automation had created an
unsafe environment.

53% of the Delta first officers agreed

and strongly agreed that automation had created an unsafe
environment.

This is the first indication where this

particular group differed significantly from the rest of the
sample.

The majority of the comments suggested that if the

automation were to create a situation that may jeopardize
safety, the pilot was apt to discontinue its use.

This was

confirmed by the results of question #13 which asked
specifically if manual backup had to be utilized.

Recalling

the fact that there was a significant difference between the
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years experience of the two carriers, the data suggest that
those with less time in the cockpit are prone to feel less
safe than those with more.

This is certainly a logical

expectation and may be the sole reason for the belief that
an unsafe environment had been created.

This is compounded

by the fact that Delta's pilot force is very junior in the
first officer position at the LAX hub.
4.

The questions regarding the specific use of

automated equipment produced similar results as the general
questions.

The answers of the pilots of Delta were

significantly different than those of American when asked if
the FMC impacted their outside scan.

It is interesting to

note that the captains of Delta felt the FMC did negatively
impact their outside scan.

One would have expected the

first officers to complain about the requirements of
automation keeping them inside the cockpit too much. None
of the pilots felt the requirements were too time consuming
though, during the critical phases of flight.

They also

were adamant in their faith in the TCAS system and its
overall effectiveness.
5.

There were disparate answers about the proficiency

level maintained on these automated cockpits.

Inferring

from the comments, it appears that there are those that do
and those that don't remain proficient and by all
indications thus far, by choice rather than design.
Additionally, the pilots were split again on the question of
increased workload with more Delta pilots indicating the
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load was increased.

This again may be due to the lessor

experience level these pilots have.

The majority of all

pilots felt that they were at minimum proficient enough to
perform manual tasks required during emergencies.
6.

A majority agreement was found among both carriers

indicating that the pilots felt automation induced
complacency on the flight deck.

The majority disagreed

however, when asked if they had been complacent specifically
in a way that detracted from their optimum performance.
This disparity may be due to the lack of comfort with the
automated environment for the majority.
Conclusions
Throughout this study a majority of the respondents
supported automation, its usage and held the beliefs that
the current environment implementing automation is a safe
and manageable one. The minority who supported the belief
that automation induces complacency, lack of proficiency or
an unsafe environment, primarily responded from a position
of lesser experience.

This was not always the case, but was

supported generally throughout.

Hence, the hypothesis was

supported since the attitudes and beliefs of the pilots from
the two carriers indicated that automation is not a
detriment to safety the majority of the time.

The rejection

of the null hypothesis also supports this conclusion since
it helped to quantify the differences of opinion to those of
the pilots with less experience.
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Recommendations
Aviation has historically been very dynamic and it
continues to be such, as well do the advances in automated
equipment and their operational implementation.

This study

was just one of many in the ongoing analysis of the pilotautomation interface and the results can only suggest that
more work need be undertaken.

This fact is accentuated by

the most recent presentation of incidents and accidents in
the January 30, 1995 issue of Aviation Week & Space
Technology.

In this issue, numerous examples of accidents

are documented describing the probable cause to be
automation related with specific citations of pilot
interface problems.

One factor was continually dominant in

these articles and was also prevalent in this study.

This

factor was that more problems are encountered, either
perceptually or actually, the less experience the pilot has.
Immediately, it would appear that increasing the pilots
proficiency and experience with the automated equipment will
help alleviate many of the perception problems discovered in
this study.

The author's experience with new equipment and

procedures followed a similar pattern as a Naval Aviator.
The more initial training received, the more relaxed and
proficient one becomes. Many of the commercial airline
training programs provide limited experience with the
automated systems in simulated sessions due to operational
and simulator commitments.

If these sessions were to be

increased initially, alleviation of some of these problems
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may be realized.

At the very least, additional training and

simulator sessions should be provided for those who feel
less comfortable and less proficient with the extensive
modes of automation.

The professional pilot should always

admit shortcomings and seek ways to alleviate them.
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Summary of the chi-square

Question #

Comparison

1
AAL vs. DAL
2
AAL vs. DAL
-AAL Captains
-DAL Captains
3
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
4
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
5
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
6
AAL vs. DAL
-AAL Captains
-DAL Captains
7
AAL vs. DAL
-AAL Captains
-DAL Captains
8
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
9
AAL vs. DAL
-AAL Captains
-DAL Captains
10
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains

*p < .05.

Chi square*

Significant

0,.81

NO

vs. First Officers
vs. First Officers

14..68
9 .01
12..24

Yes
No
Yes

vs. First Officers

6..60
3..63

No
No

vs. First Officers

6..74
2..97

No
No

vs. First Officers

3..90
4..08

No
No

vs. First Officers
vs. First Officers

9,.52
3 .93
6..01

Yes
No
No

vs. First Officers
vs. First Officers

10 .14
7 .03
4 .99

Yes
No
No

vs. First Officers

4 .15
6 .47

No
No

vs. First Officers
vs. First Officers

9 .56
1 .74
2 .71

Yes
No
No

vs. First Officers

1 .74
3 .48

No
No

Summary of the chi-square

Question #

Comparison

11
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
12
AAL vs. DAL
-AAL Captains
-DAL Captains
13
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
14
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
15
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
16
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
17
AAL vs. DAL
-AAL Captains
-DAL Captains
18
AAL vs. DAL
-All Captains
*p < .05.

Chi square*

Signifi

vs. First Officers

1.67
6.14

No
No

vs. First Officers
vs. First Officers

9.70
4.79
3.82

Yes
No
No

vs. First Officers

0.42
0.48

No
No

vs. First Officers

1.82
2.52

No
No

vs. First Officers

3.91
0.60

No
No

vs. First Officers

1.21
3.21

No
No

vs. First Officers
vs. First Officers

12.57
1.43
6.60

Yes
No
No

vs. First Officers

6.49
7.88

No
No
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October 20, 1994
William Woodrow Clark
4649 Pomona Street
Ventura, CA 93003
(805) 639-0219
American Airlines Flight Admin
P.O. Box 92246
World Way Postal Center (LAX)
Los Angeles, CA 90009
Dear Sir or Madam,
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your time and efforts with this
important endeavor. I am afoil-timestudent with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for
the degree of Master of Aeronautical Science. This survey is being conducted to fulfill the
requirements for my Graduate Thesis. Your participation is crucial in order for the research
to be effective and applicable.
Enclosed you will find a questionnaire which requests specific information regarding the
working environment of your particular cockpit. This questionnaire is being used to
determine the effect increased automation has on pilot performance. The answers to these
questions will be strictly guarded with no reference made to the pilot responding. Please
indicate your choice by circling the appropriate response. Complete confidentiality will be
maintained.
This study is a continuation of the numerous endeavors in this field. This issue has
tremendous significance in terms of safety and the future utilization of automation and manual
piloting skills. Proper choices for design and operational implementation can only be made
from a strong position of knowledge.
You will find the questionnaire straight forward and easily completed. I applaud your
professionalism for the desire to enhance the knowledge of safety issues in the aviation
community. Please respond within (2 weeks) and return the questionnaire in the envelope
provided. This questionnaire has been approved for distribution. If you have any questions
regarding the validity of this questionnaire, please contact Captain Jim Keller, Chief Pilot,
American Airlines LAX office.
Thank you again for your active participation.
Sincerely,
William Woodrow Clark (Woodie)
Lieutenant USNR-R
Naval Aviator
enclosures
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William Woodrow Clark
4649 Pomona Street
Ventura, CA 93003
(805) 639-0219
October 17, 1994
Delta Air Lines, Inc.
(LAX)
Los Angeles, CA 90009
Dear Sir or Madam,
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your time and efforts with this
important endeavor. I am a full-time student with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for
the degree of Master of Aeronautical Science. This survey is being conducted to fulfill the
requirements for my Graduate Thesis. Your participation is crucial in order for the research
to be effective and applicable.
Enclosed you will find a questionnaire which requests specific information regarding the
working environment of your particular cockpit. This questionnaire is being used to
determine the effect increased automation has on pilot performance. The answers to these
questions will be strictly guarded with no reference made to the pilot responding. Please
indicate your choice by circling the appropriate response. Complete confidentiality will be
maintained.
This study is a continuation of the numerous endeavors in this field. This issue has
tremendous significance in terms of safety and the future utilization of automation and manual
piloting skills. Proper choices for design and operational implementation can only be made
from a strong position of knowledge.
You will find the questionnaire straight forward and easily completed. I applaud your
professionalism for the desire to enhance the knowledge of safety issues in the aviation
community. Please respond within (2 weeks) and return the questionnaire in the envelope
provided. This questionnaire has been approved for distribution. If you have any questions
regarding the validity of this questionnaire, please contact Captain Dave Boaz, Chief Pilot,
Delta Air Lines LAX office.
Thank you again for your active participation.
Sincerely,
William Woodrow Clark (Woodie)
Lieutenant USNR-R
Naval Aviator
enclosures
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Questionnaire
1. Are you a Captain or First Officer?
a. Captain

b. First Officer

2. How many years experience do you have in this cockpit?
a. < 1

b. 1-2

c. 3-4

d. 5-6

e. >6

3. What percentage of flying skills do you think are automated?
a. < 25

b. 25-50

c. 51-75

d. 76-90

e. >90

4. What percentage of time do you utilize automated systems vice manual
piloting skills, to include computations, switch selection, etc.?
a. <25

b. 25-50

c. 51-75

d. 76-90

e. >90

5. Do you think that too many systems, procedures or tasks dre automated?
a. strongly
disagree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

6. Does the flight management computer keep you inside the cockpit too
much, particularly during the low altitude phases of flight during
higher traffic volume?
a. strongly
disagree
7

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

Are your manual flying skills deteriorating due to the extensive use of
automation?
a. strongly
disagree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

8. Are automation requirements too time consuming during the critical
approach and landing phase?
a.
9.

strongly
disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

Does automation increase your workload?
a. strongly
disagree

10.

b. disagree

b. disagree

c. neutral

Do you believe that extensive use of automation may induce complacency
the flight deck?
a. strongly
disagree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree
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11.

Has automation made you complacent in a way that detracted from your
optimal performance?
a. strongly
disagree

12.

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

Do you believe that continued implementation of automation will create
a future cockpit environment that is more stressful or has a higher
workload?
a. strongly
disagree

18.

c. neutral

If you agree with question #15, has this dependency created an
environment that may lead to a mishap?
a. strongly
disagree

17

b. disagree

Has the cockpit crew grown dependent upon the use of TCAS to the
detriment of a good lookout doctrine?
a. strongly
disagree

16.

e. strongly
agree

Do you fly the aircraft manually with sufficient frequency to maintain
your skills at an acceptable level, particularly with the ability to
perform required functions off-line during an emergency?
a. strongly
disagree

15.

d. agree

Has any specific task performed by automation created a situation that
required utilization of manual backup?
a. strongly
disagree

14

c. neutral

Has any form of automation created an unsafe environment in the cockpit?
a. strongly
disagree

13.

b. disagree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

Will this same future implementation shift the role of the pilot from
one of controller to one of monitor, to the detriment of the safe
conduct of the flight?
a. strongly
disagree

b. disagree

c. neutral

d. agree

e. strongly
agree

Please feel free to comment on any question by #, or make any other comments
you wish. Use the back of these sheets if desired.
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